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The purpose of this study is to examine the influencing of firm size, leverage, beta, management 
entrenchment, managerial ownership, and independent board on equity risk premium of indonesia 
public listed companies. The 70 companies  were selected randomly as the samples of this study. This 
research found that beta, management entrenchment, managerial ownership, and independent board is 
positively and significantly impact on equity risk premium, while the firm size and leverage are 
negatively and significantly affect equity risk premium. These results indicate that the higher the 
ability of management to maintain their position (management entrenchment), the higher  investment 
risk, so investors will tend to expect a higher return as well. The result also indicates that small firm 
more risky than large firms so that investors expect the equity risk premium is greater for small firms. 
Meanwhile an independent board to indicate that number of proportion of independent board at the 
company will lead to difficult decisions and unable to play the role to oversee the management, so the 
company’s risk will be increase. 
 
Keywords: Risk, Management Entrenchment, Corporate Governance, Equity Risk Premium. 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION  
Investors would like to get a higher return for each investment option they are doing. 
However, the choice of investment can not rely solely on the level of expected benefits but 
also risks to be borne. Hanafi and Halim (2000) suggests the risk is the deviation from the 
expected results. While Tandelilin (2001) suggested that the risk is likely actual return that is 
different from the expected return. Further, Tandelilin (2001) argues that the investment risk 
can be clasified into systematic and unsystematic risk. Systematic risk is the risk that can not 
be diversified because of this risk depends on various factors such as economic and political 
changes that affect all companies, while non-systematic risk is the risk can be reduced by 
forming a well-diversified portfolio.  
The relationship between risk and return can be explained through the Capital Asset 
Pricing Model (CAPM) which states that the greater risk of an investment, the greater return 
required by investors. Based on the CAPM, the return obtained by investors consist of the 
risk-free return (such as bonds interest) and an additional return for the willingness of 
investors to bear risk. Therefore, the investor would be willing to invest only in companies 
that are predicted to provide a higher return than the risk-free return. In other words, investors 
will require a premium return is greater in accordance with the size of the intensity of risk to 
be faced.  That premium return is known as the Equity Risk Premium (ERP).  
Martin and Lillo (2003) argue that ERP is the difference between the expected return of 
common stock and the return of government securities (government bonds interest). 
Meanwhile, Anin and Falaschetti (1998) define ERP as the reward that investors want to 
generate because of the uncertainty associated with the securities owned. ERP was measured 
as the excess return expected by shareholders against the return on average risk-free asset.  
Some researchers found that the level of ERP is influenced by several factors, 
including: risk factors, management entrenchment, and the quality of corporate governance. 
Collins and Huang (2010) conclude that risk factors that influence ERP consist of firm size, 
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leverage, and beta. Meanwhile, Gebhardt, Lee, and Swaminathan (2001) suggest that the 
risks of investing in a company increases when information about the company itself is 
difficult to obtain. As more information is available for large companies than small 
companies, the company's size can be used as a proxy for information availability . The more 
information available about the company, the more precise the prediction made by the 
investor, so the investment risk will be low. Because of the low-risk investment, then the 
investor will demand a lower return premium, so ERP will be low. This statement is also 
supported by Boone, Khurana, and Raman (2008) who found that firm size negatively affect 
ERP.  
Besides the risk of information, investors also face risks associated with the company's 
inability to pay debts. Companies that have relatively high debt (leverage ratio) will have the 
risk of loan defaults are higher than companies that have debt small. Boone, et al (2008), 
stated that leverage has a positive effect on ERP. Companies that are unable to pay the debt 
then the risk will be greater in the company and led to increased ERP. Bhandari (1988) found 
that the leverage ratio is positively related to the level of expected stock returns. Because the 
increase in debt is usually followed by increases in working capital in the company, it will 
lead to increased capital costs and ultimately increase the ERP.  
Other risk factors that influence the ERP is a beta. Beta is a measurement of systematic 
risk of a security or portfolio relative to the market. Fama and French (1992), found that beta 
has a weak influence on the average rate of return. But Baker, and Thuneibat (2009) found 
that beta positively correlated with the ERP. The higher of the beta, the higher of the 
systematic risk, and the higher the ERP. Boone, et al (2008) which says that in the context of 
the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), beta is the systematic risk that positively affect on 
ERP.  
High and low ERP is influenced also by management entrenchment. Collins and Huang 
(2010) found that management entrenchment can be measured by six factors, those are 
staggered boards, supermajority requirements for Mergers, limits on amending bylaws, limits 
on amending charters, poison pills, and Golden Parachutes. They found that management 
entrenchment positively affect on the cost of capital. This means that with the increasing in 
the management entrenchment will be followed by increasing of firm risk, so that the 
expected return required by investors is also increasing. It also has implications for the 
increasing cost of capital and also causes increased ERP. Hail and Leuz (2006) found that 
high quality accounting system and a strong shareholder structure can reduce the amount of 
misuse of company cash flow by the manager of the company, thus lowering the cost of 
capital so that the ERP to be low. While Asbaugh, Collins and Lafonds (2004), found that 
there was no relationship between the entrenchment index and the cost of capital.  
The quality of corporate governance can be proxied with managerial ownership and 
board of independent commissioners (Collins and Huang, 2010). Corporate governance is a 
concept proposed in order to improve corporate performance through supervision or 
monitoring of management performance and ensuring management accountability to 
shareholders by basing on the regulatory framework. Asbaugh, et al (2004), found that weak 
corporate governance can make a greater agency risk to shareholders so that the high cost of 
capital which led to increased ERP.  
Ghosh (2007) found that managerial ownership has a positive effect on firm value. 
Sundaramurthy, Rhoades, and Rechner (2005) found that there is a positive relationship 
between ownership managerial and value of the company because ownership can reduce 
managerial agency problems. While Siallagan and Machfeodez (2006) find that managerial 
ownership negatively affect the value of the company. The results of those studies have 
identified that the managers who have share capital in the company would work better, so the 
company will have a high value and low risk. It also implies that increasing/decreasing 
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companies risk align with low/high proportion of managerial ownership. Thus the investor 
who will invest in the company with high manager ownership will not demand a high return 
or in other words the expected ERP investors in these firms will be low.  
Another proxy for the quality of corporate governance is an independent board. Board 
of director is part of an important corporate governance mechanism. Asbaugh, et al (2004), 
found negative relationship between cost capital and independent board. This is also 
supported by Coliins and Huang (2010) who found that independent board negatively affect 
on the cost of capital. It means that the greater proportion of independent board, the lower the 
investment risk. Thus the investor who will invest in the company with high proportion of 
independent board will not demand a high return or in other words the expected ERP in these 
firms will be low. While Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) found that board size  negatively 
influence to performance of the company. Cheng (2006) stated that the large size of the board 
of director will be more difficult for company to set council meeting. As a result, the greater 
independent board less inefficient and slow in decision making. Lefort and Urzua (2007) 
argued that the composition of the board not affect the performance company.  
This study aims to examine the effect of firm size, leverage, beta, management 
entrenchment, managerial ownership, and independent board of the equity risk premium.  
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
2.1 Equity Risk Premium (ERP)  
According to Martin and Lillo (2003), ERP is the difference between the expected return on 
common stock and the return on government securities. Meanwhile, Anin and Falaschetti 
(1998) define ERP as the reward that investors want to deal with the uncertainty associated 
with the securities owned. ERP was measured as the excess return expected by shareholders 
against the return on average risk-free asset.  
ERP reflects the price of risk taken and is a major component of the expected return 
from risky investments. The expected return is an important determinant of the cost of capital 
and an important key in financial analysis and corporate valuation (Damodaran, 2009). ERP 
is often described as the most important value in finance and investments, for example in 
asset allocation decisions of portfolio managers, financial investment decision how to divide 
up between stocks and fixed income securities is affected ERP and their different risk 
characteristics. Meanwhile. Phillips, Baczynski, and Teale (2009) conclude that ERP is an 
important figure in the financial economy, determine asset allocation, retirement projections 
and lasting wealth, as well as the cost of capital.  
Anin and Falaschetti (1998) highlight  two common ways to estimate the ERP, that is 
historical data and market forecasts or projections. Historical data approach assumes that 
what has happened in the past is representative of what might be expected in the future. 
Meanwhile, the projection assumed that the market for ERP project can be done through a 
survey or some other projections. Most studies on ERP use historical data and assume that 
some of the past period to give the best indication of what will happen in the future.  
Anin and Falaschetti (1998) using the CAPM to calculate ERP. They stated that the 
expected return consists of two main components, namely the risk-free rate of return and risk 
premiums that can be formulated as follows:  
R i = risk-free asset return rate + risk premium  
R i = R f + βi [E (R M) - R f]  
 
where:  
R i = the expected rate of return  
β i = beta stocks  
R f = risk-free asset return rate  
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E (R M) = the expected market return  
So, a new equation to be used is:  
R i - R f = β i (Equity Risk Premium)  
Equity Risk Premium = 
        
   
 
Erb, Harvey and Viskanta (1995) found that there is no reletionship between average 
return and beta in emerging markets. These results are reinforced by Bekaert, Erb, Harvey, 
and Viskanta (1997) which examined the determination of cross-sectional equity return in 
emerging markets. They found that the CAPM fails to explain the return on emerging 
markets.  
In addition to the CAPM, there is also Fama French Three Factor Model is an extension 
of the CAPM. By Anin and Flaschetti (1998), the regression equation to estimate the cost of 
capital using the Fama French Three Factor Model can be written as follows:  
R i - R f = β i (R m - R f) + (s i x SMB) + (h i x HML)  
where:  
R i - R f = risk premium the company i  
β i, s i, h i = regression coefficient of firm i  
R M - R f = Equity Risk Premium is expected  
SMB = the size of the company's risk factors. Expected Return on a portfolio of small 
stocks minus the expected return on a portfolio of large stocks.  
HML = factor of financial difficulty, measured by equity divided by book value of 
equity market prices. The expected return on the stock portfolio of high minus the expected 
return on a portfolio of low stock.  
ERP is one of the three components of the Fama French Three Factor Model. In it there 
are three factors, namely firm size factor, the factor of financial difficulties, and the market 
risk factor (ERP). The weakness in this model is not allowed to calculate the average return 
on the company's beta in the short period (Anin and Flaschetti, 1998).  
Boone, et al. (2008) suggests an alternative approach to calculate the ERP based on 
the Ohlson and Juettner Model-Nauroth (2000), as used by Easton (2004). Basically, using 








































1 .................... (1) 
However, Easton uses the additional assumption that γ = 1 (there is no abnormal 
growth in earnings beyond the observation period). The result can be written in equation 2:  
P t = [EPS DPS +2 + t +2 t - EPS t +1] / R 
2
 ............................ .................... (2)  
By using equation 2, R lowered so that the split into the following three equations:  
R 
2
 - R (DPS t +2 / P t) - (+2 EPS t - EPS t +1) / P t = 0 ................................. (3)  
where:  
P t = t the period of the company's stock price  
EPS t +1 = 1-year EPS forecast to come  
EPS Estimates EPS t +2 = 2 years to come  
DPS DPS t +1 = forecast a year to come  
R = Risk Premium Equity  
Equation 3 assumes that abnormal earnings will always be there and will experience 
positive changes in earnings estimates. Rated R, EPS t +2> EPS t +1> 0, so that the approximate 
solution will have a positive sign (Easton, 2004).  
Easton (2004) found that the approach to account for differences in short-term 
earnings growth. Furthermore, he discusses the methodology and evaluate the price-earnings 
5 
 
growth (PEG) and suggests that researchers who need ERP estimates on the company relies 
on its approach.  
This study uses Easton approach to estimate the ERP, as based on the above 
description it can be concluded that the CAPM formula can not be used because Indonesia is 
classified as emerging market, while the Fama French Three factor model also can not be 
used in the study who only two years, while the model does not permitted for use in a short 
period.  
 
2.2 Risk Factors and equity risk premium 
2.2.1 Firm  Size  and Equity Risk Premium  
Firm size indicates the size of the companies that can be seen from the total assets owned, 
earned total sales and market capitalization. Companies that have large amounts of assets 
referred to as the big companies will get more attention from investors, creditors, 
governments and economic analysts than small firms. The greater the assets the more capital 
invested, the more sales the more the velocity of money and the larger market capitalization, 
the greater the company known to the public. Of the three variables, the value of assets is 
relatively more stable than the sales value and market capitalization to measure firm size. 
Therefore, in this study measured firm size with the natural log of total assets.  
Gebhardt, et al (2001) explains that the risks of investing in a company increases 
when information about the company itself is difficult to obtain. As more information is 
available for large companies than small companies, the company's size can be used as a 
proxy for availability information. More information is available about the company, the 
more precise the prediction made by the investor, so the investment risk will be low. Because 
of the low-risk investment, then the investor will demand a lower return, so ERP will be low. 
Banz (1981) found that there is a relationship between firm size with the average return. 
These results were also supported by Boone, et al (2008) who found that firm size negatively 
affect ERP. Based on the above description then the hypothesis is proposed:  
H1: The firm size negatively affect the Equity Risk Premium 
  
2.2.2 Leverage and the Equity Risk Premium  
Leverage ratio is the ratio of total debt to total assets of the company. Leverage ratio is used 
to determine the ability of companies to ensure the company's total debt (both short-term debt 
and long-term debt). So that the creditors would have more certainty of capital invested. The 
greater the leverage ratio, meaning the higher the value of corporate debt.  
According to Leland and Pyle (1977), the manager's decision can also be used as a 
signal that the company performs well when the company decided to take funds from outside 
(external). Companies willing to take the external funds to finance a project is a signal that 
the project can have a high intrinsic value. However, if the ratio of debt to capital is too high, 
then chances are the company to repay the debt will be low. Thus the risk of investing in 
these companies is increasing. It can be a reason to distinguish between good companies and 
bad companies based on leverage ratios. Companies that have high leverage ratios can be 
grouped into bad company, while companies with low leverage ratios can be grouped into 
good company.  
Investors will prefer to invest in companies with low leverage because it has a low 
risk, so investors will not demand a high return of investment. Bhandari (1988) found that 
leverage has a positive relationship to the level of expected return. In addition, Gebhardt, et al 
(2001) found that the level of financial leverage is expected to increase the higher the 
perceived risk of increasing the company's ERP. This is also supported by Boone, et al. 
(2001) who found that a significant positive effect of company levared on ERP. Based on the 
above description then the second hypothesis is proposed:  
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H2: Leverage positively influences on Equity Risk Premium  
 
2.3.3 Beta and Equity Risk Premium  
According to Jogiyanto (2003), beta is a measure of systematic risk of a security or portfolio 
relative to market risk. Beta measures the volatility of returns of securities securities to the 
market return. Beta measures the volatility of portfolio returns with market return portfolio. 
Normally, the beta of a stock will close to one. Stock with a beta greater than one, stock is 
very sensitive to changes in the market, stocks are called as aggressive stocks, fluctuations in 
stock returns is greater than the fluctuations of the market return. Conversely, if the beta is 
less than one then the stock is not sensitive to market changes, called defensive stocks, 
fluctuations in stock returns less than the fluctuations of the market return (Hanafi and Halim, 
2000).  
In CAPM equilibrium model, the beta greatly affects the level of expected return, the 
higher beta and market return, the higher return required by investors. As a result, beta is 
estimated to be positively correlated to the level of expected return. Meanwhile, Fama and 
French (1992) found that beta has a weak influence on the average rate of return. Baker, and 
Thuneibat (2009) found that Beta was positively correlated with the ERP. The higher beta, 
the higher systematic risk, and the higher ERP. This is also supported by Boone, et al. (2008) 
found that beta significantly and positively affect on ERP. So the third hypothesis is 
proposed:  
H3: Beta positively influence on Equity Risk Premium  
 
2.3 Management entrenchment and Equity Risk Premium  
Management entrenchment is management's ability to protect themselves from the actions 
taken by shareholders who could threaten the position of manager by replacing the manager. 
According to Collins and Huang (2010) management entrenchment can be measured by six 
factors that are the board is not strong (staggered boards), a strong demand for the merger 
(supermajority requirements for Mergers), bylaw amendment (limits on amending bylaws), a 
budget amendment basis (limits on amending charters, corporate tactics designed to takeover 
(poison pills), and the contract between the company and the employee (Golden Parachutes). 
It is also supported by Bebhuck, Cohen, and Ferrell (2008) which states that only 6 (six ) 
from the measurement of G-score is an indicator of the possibility of shareholder rights 
strength.  
The limited power of shareholders will potentially aggravate management 
entrenchment. Bebhuck, et al (2008) using the presence or absence six provision to develop 
the entrenchment index. Index built by adding a number of factors entrenchment of on 
regulations. So the value of the index would be worth from 0 to 6. For the context of 
Indonesia, the possibility of management entrenchment measure would be in trouble with 6 
measurements. Therefore, in this study using only two measurements of the board of 
management entrenchment is not strong (staggered boards) and strong demand for the merger 
(supermajority requirements for Mergers).  
Collins and Huang (2010) found that management entrenchment positively effect on 
the cost of capital so that the ERP increases. Albuquerue and Wang (2008), found that weak 
investor protection used by managers and lead investors demand a higher return that 
ultimately impact on increasing ERP. Hail and Leuz (2006) found that high quality 
accounting system and a strong shareholder structure can reduce the amount of misuse of 
company cash flow by the manager of the company, thus decreasing of the cost of capital so 
that the ERP to be low. While Asbaugh, et al (2004) found no relationship between the 
entrenchment index and the cost of capital. It is proposed the fourth hypothesis is:  




2.4 Quality of Corporate Governance  
Corporate governance is a concept proposed in order to improve corporate performance 
through supervision or monitoring of management performance and ensuring management 
accountability to shareholders by basing on the regulatory framework. Proposed the concept 
of corporate governance for the achievement of corporate management more transparent to 
all users of financial statements. If this concept is applied properly it is expected that 
economic growth will continue to rise in line with the transparency of corporate management 
better and will benefit many parties. According to Abdullah and Valentine (2009), Corporate 
governance is a process and structure used to direct and manage the business affairs of the 
company's business prosperity and improve corporate accountability with the ultimate goal of 
realizing long term shareholder value, while considering the interests of other stakeholders.  
Yeh, Lee, and Ko (2002) states that the major contribution of corporate governance in 
companies that improve the operating performance and prevent fraud. According to Black, 
Jang, and Kan (2002), firms with better corporate governance have better operating 
performance than firms with poor corporate governance. Corporate governance does not only 
provide useful information to investors and creditors to reduce the information asymmetry 
but also helping companies to improve operations.  
Agency issues and corporate governance are the two things are interlinked. In the 
corporate context, agency problems were more concerned with the relationship between 
managers with shareholders who are not involved in management, corporate governance 
while looking at the relationship between managers and shareholders of the company. 
Corporate governance has a principle of transparency, openness and accountability so that the 
company's corporate governance is both will be able to reduce the agency problem. 
According to Collins and Huang (2010), the quality of corporate governance can be proxied 
with managerial ownership and board independence.  
 
2.4.1 Managerial Ownership and Equity Risk Premium  
Managerial ownership is the ownership of shares by the company management as measured 
by the percentage of shares owned by management (Sujono and Soebiantoro, 2007,  
Sabrinna, 2010). Itturiaga and Sanz (1998), found that managerial ownership structure can be 
explained from two points of view that is agency approach and asymmetric information 
approach. Agency approach considers managerial ownership structure as an instrument or a 
tool to reduce agency conflicts between some of the claims (claim holder) against the 
company. Asymetric information approach views that managerial ownership structure as a 
way to reduce the imbalance of information between insider and outsider through the 
disclosure of information in capital markets.  
Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest that in order to reduce conflicts of interest 
between shareholders (principal) and management (agent) can be done by improving the 
managerial ownership of a company. They also argue that increasing managerial ownership 
in the company encourages managers to create an optimal performance of the company and 
motivate managers to act with caution, because they bear the consequences of his actions.  
With the ownership in a company's management will lead to an interesting conjecture 
that the value of the firm increases as a result of increased management ownership. 
Ownership by management that will most effectively monitoring the activities of the 
company. If a company is partly owned by the manager means the manager was among those 
who own the company. That way the manager will act not deviate, in other words, a manager 
will do their best to create the prosperity of the shareholders, including himself (Christiawan 
and Tarin, 2007).  
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Collins and Huang (2010) found that managerial ownership negatively affect the cost 
of capital. While, Ghosh (2007) provided the empirical evidence on the positive relationship 
between managerial ownership and firm value. Sundaramurthy, Rhoades, and Rechner (2005) 
found that there is a positive relationship between ownership managerial and value of the 
company because ownership can reduce managerial agency problems. Leland and Pyle 
(1977) find that managerial ownership and performance has a positive relationship. The 
results of these studies have indicated that the managerial stake in the company would work 
better so that the company will have a high value of the company. It also implies the 
companies with higher managerial ownership levels have a lower risk. Thus the investor who 
will invest in the company will not demand a high return or in other words the expected ERP 
investors in these firms will be low. Based on the description above, the fifth hypothesis is:  
H5: Managerial Ownership negatively effect on the Equity Risk Premium  
 
2.4.2 Independent Board  
Independent board is part of an important corporate governance mechanism. Board is an 
independent organ in charge of corporate and collective responsibility to supervise and give 
advice to directors and to ensure that companies implement corporate governance (FCGI, 
2006). Independent board as the culmination of the company's internal management system, 
has the role of surveillance activity.  
Independent board is at the core of corporate governance are assigned to ensure the 
implementation of corporate strategy, overseeing the management in managing the company, 
and require the implementation of accountability (FCGI, 2006). In essence, an independent 
board is a mechanism, a mechanism to oversee and provide guidance and direction to the 
manager of the company. Asbaugh, et al (2004), found negative relationship between cost 
capital and independent board. This is also supported by Collins and Huang (2010) found that 
independent board negative effect on the cost of capital. This means that the greater 
proportion of independent board, the lower the risk of investing in these companies. Thus the 
investor who will invest in the company will not demand a high return or in other words the 
expected ERP investors in these firms will be low. Based on the description above, the sixth 
hypothesis is:  
H6:  The Independent board negatively effect on the Equity Risk Premium  
 
3. METHODS  
3,1. Sample Selection  
The population in this study are all companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (BEI), 
from 2007 until 2008. While the sample of 80 companies were selected based simple random 
sampling.  
3.2.Research Variables and Measurement  
3.2.1.Equity Risk Premium (ERP)  
Dependent variable in this research is equity risk premium (ERP), In this study, ERP 
was calculated using the approach Easton (2004) based on the model of Ohlson and Juettner-
Nauroth as follows:  
R 
2
 - R (DPS t +1 / P t) - (+2 EPS t - EPS t +1) / P t = 0  
where:  
P t = t the period of the company's stock price  
EPS t +1 = 1-year EPS forecast to come  
EPS Estimates EPS t +2 = 2 years to come  
Estimated DPS DPS 1 = 1 year to come  
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R = Risk Premium Equity  
Above equation would be completed by using the quadratic equation solution as 
follows:  








By exploring the equation above, this study will genarate two values of R with different signs 
(positive and negative). Under the Easton (2004), the estimated R PEG, EPS t +2> EPS t +1> 0, so 
the value of which has a positive sign that will be taken.  
 
3.2.2.Company Size (SIZE) 
Firm size indicates the size of the companies that can be seen from the total assets owned, 
earned total sales and market capitalization. Firm size will measure by the natural logarithm 
of total assets owned by the company.  
 
3.2.3.Leverage ratio (LEV)  
Leverage ratio is the ratio of total debt to total assets of the company. Leverage ratio is 





3.2.3.Beta (BETA)   
Beta is a measure of systematic risk of a security or portfolio relative to market risk. 
Beta values calculated by the following formula (Hanafi and Halim, 2000):   
    
                                     
                  
 
The stock return and market return is calculated by the following formula:  
 
Rit = 
         
     
  RMt = 
             
       
 
where:  
Rit  = return of the company i in period t  
         = Average stock return of firm i in period t  
RMt  = the market return in period t 
          = Average market return in period t  
Pit  = stock price of the company i in period t 
Pt-1  = stock price of the company i in period t-1 
IHSGt  = composite index in period t 
IHSGt-1 = composite index in period t-1  
 
3.2.4. Management entrenchment (ME)  
Management entrenchment is management's ability to protect themselves from the actions 
taken by shareholders who could threaten the position of manager by replacing the manager. 
Management entrenchment measured by looking at two of the six proxies were found by 
Collins and Huang (2010) that the board is not strong (staggered boards) and strong demand 
for the merger (supermajority requirements for Mergers). How to measure the board of 
commissioners who are not strong (staggered boards) is to see the number of independent 
board than the number of commissioners in the sample companies. If the proportion of 
independent board below average proportion of independent commissioner for the entire 
     
           
   
 




sample of the management entrenchment in the given value of 1, whereas if the proportion of 
independent board above average proportion of independent commissioner for the entire 
sample of the management entrenchment in the given value of 0. Strong demand for the 
merger (supermajority requirements for Mergers) seen from the percentage of shares owned 
by dominant shareholders. If greater than 50% of the management entrenchment in the given 
values of 0, while if less than 50% of the management entrenchment in the given value of 1.  
Sample company will obtain the value 1 for each characteristic is fulfilled and the 
value 0 for any characteristics that are not being met. So that management entrenchment 
index will be 0 to 2. The higher the value of management entrenchment index, the higher the 
level of managers' ability to maintain its position. Based on the index, then the company can 
be classified into three groups: firms with lower levels of management entrenchment (index = 
0), m anagement entrenchment is (index = 1), and higher management entrenchment (index = 
2).  
 
3.2.5. Managerial ownership 
Managerial ownership is the ownership of shares by the company management as measured 
by the percentage of shares owned by management. Managerial ownership is measured by 
dividing the number of shares owned by directors and commissioners on the number of total 
shares outstanding.  
     The number of shares owned by directors and commissioners  
 MO  =   
Total number of shares outstanding  
 
3.2.6. Independent Board 
Board is an independent organ in charge of corporate and collective responsibility to 
supervise and give advice to directors and to ensure that companies implement corporate 
governance. Independent board was measured using the proportion of independent board 
members to total members of the board of commissioners.  
     the number of independent commisioners 
 IB  =   
  Total member of commissioners 
  
3.3. Method of Analysis  
Testing of hypothesis in this study using multiple regression analysis. The regression 
equation is used to test the hypotheses are:  
ERPt = α − β1SIZEt + β2LEVt + β3BETAt + β4MEt – β5MOt − β1IBt 
where:  
ERP Equity Risk Premium t = firm in period t  
α = a constant coefficient  
β1-6 = regression coefficient of independent variables  
SIZE = Firm size t in period t  
LEV t = Leverage ratio of firms in period t  
BETAt = Beta firm in period t  
ME t = Management entrenchment firms in period t  
MO T = Managerial Ownership firm in period t  




4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION  
4.1 Descriptive Statistics  
Table 1 shows that the average value of 0.18997 for ERP variables or the average investor in 
Indonesia Stock Exchange requires equity risk premium of 18.997% with a standard 
deviation of 0.4527, or 45.27%, moreover,  the lowest and the highest of equity risk premium 
respectively are 0 % and 45.27%. Average of the selected sample has total assets of Rp. 
4,770,200,000,000 with a standard deviation of Rp.9.094.282.282.000, as well as the largest 
and smallest sample firms had assets amounting to Rp. 54,059,522,000,000, and 
Rp.20.908.000.000. Comparison of corporate debt to assets shows that the average value is 
0.5443 with a standard deviation value of 0.2609 and the minimum and maximum values 
respectively of 0.0211 and 1.1266. This indicated that 54.43% of corporate assets financed by 
debt. Systematic risk of the company as measured by beta indicates that the average value of 
0.1635 with a standard deviation of 0.7647. average proportion of shares held by the board of 
directors and commissioners amounted to 0.0152 or 1.52%. The proportion of independent 
board in the company of the sample is at 0.4072, or 40.72%. It is meaningful that the average 
sample company already has an independent board composition in accordance with Bapepam 
is 1/3 of the board of commissioners. However, there are also companies with board 
composition is not in accordance with the provisions of Bapepam is equal to 16.67%.  
 
Table 1  
Descriptive Statistics  
V ariabel  Minimum  Maximum  Average  Standard Deviation  
ERP  0.0000  3.3198  0,1899 7  0.4527  
SIZE *  20 908  54059522  4770200  9094282.282  
LEV  0.0211  1.1266  0.5442  0,260 9  
BETA  -2.3797  7.0773  0.1635  0,764 7  
MO 0,00 00  0.5315  0.0152  0,069 9  
IB  0.1667  0.7500  0.4072  0,119 1  
* In millions of dollars  
Management entrenchment (ME) diproksikan of the value of staggered boards and 
supermajority requirements for Mergers company into the study sample. The higher the value 
of management entrenchment index, the higher the level of manager to maintain its position. 
From Table 2 it can be seen the frequency and percentage of company management 
entrenchment of low, medium and high. Based on the table there are 38 companies that 
management entrenchment is low during the period of observation, or by 27.1%, 
management entrenchment was found 69 companies or 49.3%, and management 
entrenchment is high there are 33 companies or 23.6%.  
 
Table 2  
Frequency Distribution Management entrenchment  
Category  Frequency  Percent  
Low  38  27.1  
Was  69  49.3  






4.2. Hypothesis Testing  
F test used to determine whether the regression model of this study fit or not (goodness of fit 
model). The results of testing of the F test is performed using the dependent variable ERP and 
six independent variable: SIZE, LEV, BETA, ME, KM, and DKI for 1006 F values obtained 
with significantly smaller than α = 0.05 means that the model regression is good enough to 
predict the Equity Risk Premium firms sampled in this study.  
The coefficient of determination (R 
2)
 measures how much the ability of the model in 
explaining the variation in the dependent variable. Based on testing of linear regression of 
this research model, adjusted R 
2
 values obtained for 0.977 or by 97.7%, while the R 
2
 value 
of 0.978 or 97.8%. Thus it can be concluded that 97.7% of the variation can be explained by 
SIZE, LEV, BETA, ME, KM, and DKI, while the remaining 2.3% is explained by other 
variables outside the model.  
 
4.5 Hypothesis Testing Results  
The study consisted of 6 (six) hypotheses were tested to see the effect of firm size (SIZE), 
leverage (LEV), beta (\BETA), management entrenchment (ME), managerial ownership 
(KM), and an independent board (DKI) of the Equity Risk Premium (ERP) company.  
 
Table 4.10  
Hypothesis Testing Results  
Variables  Prediction  Beta  t  Sig.  
SIZE  -  - 4.613  -16.630  0.000 ***  
LEV  +  -1.264  -17.896  0.000 ***  
BETA  +  , 371  4.635  0.000 ***  
ME  +  1.339  15.537  0.000 ***  
MO -  , 131  9.499  0.000 ***  
IB  -  4.989  25.409  0.000 ***  
R 
2
  0.978  
F  1006  
Sig-F  0.000 ***  
DW  2.183  
*** Significant at 1% level  
 
The first hypothesis states that the size of the company's negative effect on the equity risk 
premium. The results show that company size has a significant negative impact on equity risk 
premium. Based on these results we can conclude that the first hypothesis in this study is 
accepted. Significant negative effect of firm size on equity risk premium shows that small 
firms more risky than large companies so that investors expect the equity risk premium is 
greater for small firms, whereas equity risk premium that investors demand will be low for 
large companies that can allow investors to predict future risk and return. Gebhdart, et al. 
(2001) found that the risk of investing in a company increases when information about the 
company itself is difficult to obtain. The more information available about the company, the 
more precise the prediction made by the investor, so the investment risk will be low. Because 
of the low-risk investment, then the investor will demand a lower return, thus equity risk 
premium will be low. The results of this study support the Boone, et al. (2008) who found 
that firm size negatively affect the equity risk premium. It also supports the statement of Banz 
(1981) who conclude that there are negative effects of firm size on the average return.  
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The second hypothesis states that leverage has a positive effect on equity risk 
premium. Test results show that leverage has a significant negative impact on equity risk 
premium. Based on these results we can conclude that the second hypothesis in this study 
was rejected.  Significant negative result because it is assumed that investors might assume 
that the company's growing debt is to increase the use of capital and the results have not been 
able to be enjoyed in the short term, so the leverage ratio will look great. Jensen (1986) states 
that the debt can be used as a tool for monitoring the manager to reduce his activities that can 
not maximize firm value. Investors have confidence that the company has performed well in 
the future, so that investment risk will be low. Because low-risk investments that the investor 
will demand a lower return, thus the equity risk premium is expected to be low. The results of 
this study, is not consistent with previous research which states that a significant positive 
effect of leverage on equity risk premium (Boone, et al., 2008). These results are also 
incompatible with the Gebhardt, et al. (2001) who found that the higher financial leverage is 
expected to increase the company's equity risk premium.  
The third hypothesis states that the beta positive effect on equity risk premium. Test 
results showed that the beta have a significant positive impact on equity risk premium. Based 
on these results we can conclude that the third hypothesis in this study is accepted. 
Significant positive results show that the higher the beta, the risk will be higher, thus 
increasing the company's equity risk premium. The results of this third hypothesis gives 
support to the research by Boone, et al (2008) which states that the beta has positive 
significant effect on the equity risk premium and also supports Baker and Thuneibat (2009) 
who found that the beta was positively correlated to the equity risk premium.  
The fourth hypothesis states that the management entrenchment positive effect on 
equity risk premium. The test results indicate that management entrenchment has a 
significant positive impact on equity risk premium. Based on these results we can conclude 
that the fourth hypothesis in this study is accepted. Significant positive results show that the 
higher ability of management to maintain its position, the higher the risk of investing in these 
companies. Thus the investor who will invest in the company will demand a high return or in 
other words the equity risk premium that investors expected the company would be high. 
These results support the fourth hypothesis on the results of research by Collins and Huang 
(2010) who found that management entrenchment positive effect on the cost of capital so that 
the equity risk premium increases. It also supports Albuquerue and Wang (2008) who finds 
that weak investor protection used by the manager who led investors demand a higher return 
and ultimately impact on the increased equity risk premium.  
The fifth hypothesis states that managerial ownership negative effect on the equity 
risk premium. Test results show that managerial ownership have a significant positive impact 
on equity risk premium. Based on these results we can conclude that the fifth hypothesis of 
this study is rejected. Significant positive results show that managers who have relatively 
high shares will easily maintain its position. Siallagan and Machfeodez (2006) find that 
managerial ownership negatively affect the value of the company. The results indicate that 
the managerial stake in the company will have a tendency to act opportunistic. Investors 
consider a company with high managerial ownership would be more at risk so that investors 
will demand higher returns or in other words the equity risk premium that investors are 
expected to be high. The results of this study, is not consistent with previous research which 
states that managerial ownership negatively affect the cost of capital (Collins and Huang., 
2010). These results are also not inconsistent with Ghosh (2007) and Sundaramurthy, 
Rhoades, and Rechner (2005) who find that managerial ownership has a positive effect on 
firm value. The results of these studies have indicated that the managerial stake in the 
company will have a high value of the company. This implies that the company's risk 
reduction in equity risk premium will be low as well.  
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The sixth hypothesis stated that an independent board negative effect on the equity 
risk premium. Test results showed that the independent board have a significant positive 
impact on equity risk premium. Based on these results we can conclude that the sixth 
hypothesis of this study is rejected. Significant positive results due to possible presence of an 
independent board that is not professional and have not been able to play its role to oversee 
the management. Cheng (2006) states that the size of a large independent commissioners will 
be more difficult for companies to set up a council meeting. The amount of the proportion of 
independent board resulting in less efficient and slow in decision making, so the company 
will increase the risk that caused the high return expected by investors and the equity risk 
premium will increase as well. The results of this study, is not consistent with previous 
research which states that an independent board negatively affect the cost of capital 
(Asbaugh, et al., 2004) and (Collins and Huang., 2010). This means that the more the 
proportion of independent board, the lower the investment risk of the equity risk premium 
will be low.  
 
5. CONCLUSIONS, IMPLICATIONS, LIMITATIONS, AND ADVICE  
5.1 Conclusion  
1.  firm size negatively affect equity risk premium. This result suggests that small firms more 
risky than large companies so that investors expect the equity risk premium is greater for 
small firms  
2.  Leverage negatively impact on equity risk premium. This finding shows that the debt can 
be used as a tool for monitoring the manager to reduce his activities that can not maximize 
firm value. Investors assume that companies taking advantage of the growing debt for 
working capital firm and the results have not been able to be enjoyed in the short term, so 
the leverage ratio will look great. But investors have confidence that the company has 
performed well in the future, so that investment risk will be low. Thus the expected equity 
risk premium will be low.  
3. Beta significantly and positively effect on equity risk premium. This result shows that the 
higher the beta, the risk will be higher, thus increasing the company's equity risk premium.  
4. Management entrenchment significantly and positively effect on equity risk premium. This 
finding suggests that the higher the ability of management to maintain its position, the 
higher the risk of investing in these companies. Thus the investor who will invest in the 
company will demand a high return or in other words the equity risk premium that 
investors expected the company would be high.  
5. managerial ownership has a positive effect on equity risk premium. This result suggests 
that managers who have relatively high shares will easily maintain its position will tend to  
opportunistic. Thus investors consider a company with high managerial ownership would 
be more risky.  
6. Independent board have a positive significant effect on the equity risk premium. It 
indicates the presence of independent commissioners who are not professional and have 
not been able to play its role to oversee the management and the large proportion of 
independent board resulting in less efficient and slow decision making, so the company 
will increase the risk of causing a high return expected by investors and the equity risk 
premium will increase as well.  
 
5.2 Implications of Research Findings  
In this study the management entrenchment effect is significantly positive. This indicates 
that the higher the ability of management to maintain its position, is considered by the 
investor will have an impact on investment performance and risk. The higher the 
investment risk so investors expecting high returns for companies that entered the category 
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of companies whose management is able to maintain its position easily. To overcome this, 
the need to formulate a rule by the various parties, particularly Bapepam which serves to 
prevent excessive management entrenchment. The results also showed that two 
mechanisms of good corporate governance and managerial ownership is an independent 
board can not change the perception of investors against the risk of the company. This may 
be caused by independent commissioners have not been able to play its role to oversee the 
management.  
The results showed that risk factors (firm size, leverage) are significantly negative 
effect on the equity risk premium, while the beta, management entrenchment, and the 
quality of corporate governance (managerial ownership and board of independent 
commissioners) are significantly positive effect on equity risk premium. It can be taken 
into consideration for investors to look at risk factors, management entrenchment, and the 
quality of corporate governance in their investment decisions.  
 
5.3 Limitations of Research  
 
1. Period of observation in this study only two (2) years so that the calculation of equity 
risk premium is less able to represent the change in equity risk premium is larger in 
previous years.  
2. Measurement of management entrenchment in this study using only two of six 
measurements since only see the financial statements of existing companies.  
5.4 Suggestions for Further Research  
1. Extend the observation period of study to obtain the calculation of equity risk 
premium is expected to be more accurate to better explain the equity risk premium.  
2. Further research should use other sources in order to measure the six existing 
management entrenchment because p engukuran management entrenchment in this 
study uses only the source of the financial statements alone.  
 
REFERENCES  
Abdullah, Haslinda., dan Benedict Valentine. (2009). Fundamental and Ethics Theories of 
Corporate Governance. Middle Eastern Finance and Economics-Issue 4, 88-96. 
Albuquerque, Rui., and Neng, Wang. (2008). Agency Conflict, Investment, and Asset 
Pricing. The Journal Of Finance, 63, 1-40. 
Annin, Michael and Dominic, Flaschetti.(1998). Equity Risk Premium Article. IL : Ibbotson 
Associates. 
Ashbaugh, Hollis., Collins, Daniel W., dan Lafond, Ryan. (2004). Corporate Governance and 
the Cost of Equity Capital. University of Wisconsin-Madison, Working paper-Madison. 
Baker, Rana Ahmad., and Thuneibat Ali. (2009). Audit tenure and Equity Risk Premium : 
Evidence From Jordan. International Journal of Accounting and Information 
Management, 19, 5-23. 
Banz, Rolf W. (1981). The Relationship between return and Market value of Common Stock. 
Journal of Financial Economics. Vol 9. 
Bebchuk, Lucian., Alma, Cohen,. and Allen Ferrell. (2008). What Matters in Corporate 
Governance ?. The Review of Financial Studies 
Bekaert, Geert., Erb, Claude., Harvey, Campbell., dan Viskanta, Tadas. (1997). The Cross-
Sectional Determinants of Emerging Market Returns. Journal of Finance. 
Bhandari, L. (1998). Debt/Equity ratio and Expected Common Stock Returns : Empirical 
Evidance. Journal of Financial, 43. 
16 
 
Boone, Jeff P., Inder, K Khurana., and K, K Raman. (2008). Audit Firm Tenure and the 
Equity Risk Premium, Journal of Accounting Auditing and Finance, Forthcoming. 
(online) (Diakses 12 Oktober 2011) Tersedia di : http://ssrn.com/abstract=940401. 
Cheng, Shijun. (2006). Board Size and Variabilty of Corporate Performance. Journal of 
Financial Economics. 
Collins, Denton., and Henry, Huang. (2010). Management entrenchment and cost of equity 
capital. Journal of Business Research 64, 356-362. 
Damodaran,  Aswath. (2009). Equity  Risk Premium (ERP) : Determinants, Estimation and 
Implication.. Journal of Accounting and Economics. (Online) (Diakses 15 Oktober 
2011) Tersedia di : http://ssrn.com/abstract=1492717. 
Dielman, Terry E. (1961). Applied Regression Analysis for Business and Economics. PWS-
KENT Publishing Company. 
Easton, P. (2004). PE Ratios, PEG Ratios, and Estimating the Implied Expected Rate of 
Return on Equity Capital. The Accounting Review 79 (1). Pp 73-95. 
Erb, Cloude B., Harvey, Campbell R., dan Viskanta, Tadas E. (1995). Country credit Risk 
and Global Portofolio selection. Journal of Portofolio Management, winter. 
Fama, eugene F., dan French, Kenneth R. (1992). The Cross Section of Expected returns. 
Journal of Finance, 47 (2). 
Forum For Corporate Governance in Indonesia. (2006). Peranan Dewan Komisaris dan 
Komite Audit Dalam Pelaksanaan Corporate Governance (Tata Kelolan Perusahaan). 
FCGI Booklet II. 
Gebhardt, W., Lee, C., dan Swaminathan, B. (2000). Toward and implied Cost of Capital. 
Journal of  Accounting Research 39 (1) : 135-176. 
Ghosh. (2007). External Auditing, Manajerial Monitoring and Firm Valuation : An Empirical 
Analysis for India. MPRA paper No.17142 
Ghozali, Imam. (2002). Aplikasi Analisis Multivariate Dengan Program SPSS. Semarang : 
Badan Penerbit UNDIP 
Gujarati, Damodar N. (2004). Basic Econometrics. Edisi Empat. Amerika Serikat: The 
McGraw-Hill Companies. 
Hail, Luzi., dan Christian, Leuz. (2006). International Differences in the Cost of Equity 
Capital : Do Legal Institutions and Securities Regulation Matter? Journal of Accounting 
Reseacrch. 
Hanafi, Mamduh M., dan Abdul, Halim. (2000). Analisis Laporan Keuangan. Edisi Revisi. 
Yogyakarta : UPP AMP YKPN. 
Hermalin, Benjamin E., and Michael S, Weisbach. (1988). The Determinants of Board 
Composition. Journal of Economics, 19,589-606. 
Indriantoro, Nur., dan Bambang, Supomo. (2002). Metodologi Penelitian Bisnis untuk 
Akuntansi dan manajemen, Edisi pertama. Yogyakarta : BPFE-Yogyakarta. 
Itturiaga, F.J.L and Sanz J.A.R. (1998). Ownership Structure, Corporate Value and Firm 
Investment : A Spanish Firm Simultaneous Equations Analysis. Working Paper ; 
Universidad De Vallodolid, 1-32. 
Jensen, M. (1986). Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance and Takeovers. 
American Economic Review, 76, 323-399. 
Jensen, Michael C., and William, H Meckling. (1976). Theory of the firm : Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Sttructure. Journal of Financial Economic, 3, 
305-360. 
Jogiyanto. (2003). Teori Portofolio dan Analisis Investasi. Edisi Ketiga.                                                                                                                       
Yogyakarta : BPFE UGM. 
17 
 
Lefort, Fernando., and Francisco, Urzua. (2007). Board Independence, Firm performance adn 
Ownership Concentration : Evidence From Chile. Journal of Business Research, 61, 
615-622. 
Leland, Hayne E., and David H, Pyle. (1977). Informational Asymmetries, Financial 
Structure, and Financial Intermediation. The Journal of Finance, 32, 371-387. 
Martin, J Rodrigo Fuentes San., and Lillo, Salvador Zurita. (2003). The Equity Risk premium 
in Emerging Market : The Case of Chile,1-26. 
Ohlson, James A and Beate E, Juttner-Nauroth. (2000). Expected EPS and EPS Growth as 
Determinants of Value. Review of Accounting Studies 10. 
Sabrinna, Anindhita Ira. (2010). Pengaruh Corporate Governance Dan Struktur Kepemilikan 
Terhadap Kinerja Perusahaan. Skripsi dipublikasikan. Semarang. Fakultas Ekonomi 
Universitas Diponogero 
Sekaran, Uma. (2006). Research Methods for Business. Edisi 4. Jakarta : Salemba Empat. 
Siallagan, Hamongan., dan Machfeodez, Mas’ud. (2006). Mekanisme Corporate Governance, 
Kualitas Laba dan Nilai Perusahaan. SNA IX Padang. 
Sundaramurthy, Chamu., Dawna L, Rhoades., and Paula L, Rechner. (2005). A Meta 
Analysis of the Effects of Executive and Institutional Ownership on Firm Performance. 
Journal of Managerial Issues, 17, 494-510. 
Tandelilin, Eduardus. (2001). Analisis Investasi dan Manajemen Portofolio. Edisi Pertama. 
Yogyakarta : BPFE. 
Tarigan, Josep R., dan Suparmoko. (1995). Metode Pengumpulan Data Untuk ilmu-ilmu 
Sosial dan Ekonomi, Edisi 1. Yogyakarta : BPFE 
